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STOP HAMMERING FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS: RESHAPING THE 
COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION 
WITH THE PHYSICAL INTRUSION 
STANDARD 
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the community 
caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  As its name suggests, the exception 
acknowledges that police officers act not merely as law enforcers, but also 
as community caretakers, rendering aid to those in need, and acting to 
protect both people and property from harm.  As originally conceived, the 
community caretaking exception was limited to situations involving 
automobiles where police were performing functions totally divorced 
from law enforcement.  Over the years, courts have expanded the 
exception considerably.  Police officers who suspect a crime has taken 
place may now search without a warrant as long as those officers—or a 
court—can articulate an objectively reasonable basis for community 
caretaking after the fact.  Worse still, many jurisdictions allow these 
warrantless searches in homes.  What began as a reasonable and limited 
exception has become a mechanism that allows police officers—with the 
courts at times acting as their willing accomplices—to use false concern 
for citizens’ welfare as a subterfuge to enter their homes at will to 
investigate crime.  This Comment urges the U.S. Supreme Court to use the 
recently revived physical trespass standard to reshape the community 
caretaking exception and restore to their preeminent level the Fourth 
Amendment guarantees that once protected our hearths and homes. 
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2013] THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION 125 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 1969, Chester Dombrowski drove his rented 
vehicle off the road outside West Bend, Wisconsin.1  While responding 
to the accident, local police learned that Dombrowski was a Chicago 
police officer.2  Dombrowski appeared intoxicated and was arrested for 
drunken driving.3  Because of the injuries Dombrowski sustained in the 
accident, the police transported him to the local hospital.4  Dombrowski 
lapsed into a coma, during which time an officer searched his car in an 
effort to locate Dombrowski’s duty revolver.5  The officer was unable to 
locate the revolver, but when he opened the locked trunk of the car, he 
found clothing, a nightstick, a floor mat, and a towel—all of which were 
covered in blood.6  Dombrowski was subsequently charged with first-
degree murder.7  During the trial, he objected to the admission of the 
evidence recovered from the trunk because the officer obtained it 
without a warrant.8  The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction on appeal, holding that when the officer opened the locked 
car trunk, it was not a search.9  While in prison, Dombrowski brought a 
habeas corpus action in federal court again arguing that the evidence 
was acquired in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.10  His case 
made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court held that the search 
was reasonable because the police officer was exercising a “community 
caretaking function[], totally divorced from the detection, investigation, 
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” 
when the officer entered the locked trunk to secure Dombrowski’s 
property.11  This case, Cady v. Dombrowski, gave rise to what has 
become known as the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against warrantless—and thus unreasonable—
searches.12 
 
1. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 434–36 (1973). 
2. Id. at 436. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 436–37. 
6. Id. at 437. 
7. State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 492, 171 N.W.2d 349, 352–53 (1969). 
8. Id. at 493–94. 
9. See id. at 496. 
10. Dombrowski v. Cady, 319 F. Supp. 530, 530 (E.D. Wis. 1970), rev’d, 471 F.2d 280 
(7th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
11. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 448. 
12. Id. at 441–43. 
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The community caretaking exception provides that “a police officer 
serving as a community caretaker to protect persons and property may 
be constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches.”13  The 
concept of “‘[c]ommunity caretaking’ denotes a wide range of everyday 
police activities undertaken to aid those in danger of physical harm, to 
preserve property, or []to [‘]create and maintain a feeling of security in 
the community.’”14  In Cady, for example, police were acting to preserve 
Dombrowski’s property and protect the public from the danger of an 
unsecured weapon when they searched his vehicle for his service 
revolver.15  When the community caretaking exception was established, 
it was strictly limited to vehicle searches.16  However, that limitation did 
not hold and the community caretaking exception was eventually 
expanded beyond vehicle searches and into homes, as illustrated by a 
recent Wisconsin case.17 
On August 24, 2006, Milwaukee police received an anonymous tip 
that Juiquin Pinkard and his girlfriend “appeared to be sleeping” near 
“cocaine, money and a scale” in an apartment, the door to which was 
ajar.18  The officer who received the tip “was concerned” about Pinkard 
and his girlfriend, so he contacted a member of the police gang unit, 
who later testified that he thought the description of the apartment 
“sounded like a drug house.”19  When he and four other officers went to 
check on the couple, they knocked on the door, which was “three-
quarters open,” but received no answer.20  After only thirty to forty-five 
seconds, the gang unit entered the apartment and soon located the 
couple asleep—along with drugs, cash, and a handgun.21  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld Pinkard’s conviction for drug possession, holding 
 
13. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
14. Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 272 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-2.2 (1980)). 
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
16. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441–43, 447–48. 
17. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 27. 
18. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 7, State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592 (No. 2008AP1204-CR), 2009 WL 3443175 at *5. 
19. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 18, at 7.  Despite their concern, officers did 
not bring emergency medical personnel with them to the apartment, and they later testified 
that they did not believe there was a medical emergency at the time they entered the home.  
Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 85–88. 
20. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
21. Id. at 8–9. 
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that the community caretaking exception applied to the search of his 
home.22  This holding expanded the community caretaking exception by 
changing it from a justification for inventory searches of vehicles, 
“totally divorced” from investigation, to a justification for warrantless 
home entries and searches, conducted for the mixed motives of 
caretaking and investigation.23  Under the aegis of community 
caretaking, police, originally allowed to act only for the protection of 
people and property in vehicles, could now search a home for evidence 
of a crime without a warrant as long as they had some level of concern 
for the welfare of the suspect—or some concern could be articulated 
after the fact.24 
Dissenting in Cady, a prescient Justice Brennan seemed to warn the 
majority that the community caretaking exception was not quite as 
benign as it thought, calling the exception a “serious departure from 
established Fourth Amendment principles.”25  Thirty-seven years later, 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Ann Walsh Bradley issued a similar 
warning to her colleagues26 as they added Wisconsin, the very state that 
created the Cady community caretaking exception, to the growing list of 
jurisdictions that reject the limitation of the exception to vehicles and 
use it instead to justify the warrantless search of a home.27  The justices’ 
warnings have gone unheeded and, consequently, the potential 
problems about which they warned have become reality.  While the 
Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have continued to limit the 
application of the community caretaking exception to automobiles,28 the 
Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and an increasing number of state 
 
22. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 16, 28. 
23.  Id. (“[W]e have concluded that under certain circumstances a reasonably exercised 
community caretaker function may permit a warrantless entry into a home . . . .”); see also 
infra Part II.C.2.e. 
24. See, e.g., infra notes 176–78, 265 and accompanying text. 
25. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 454 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I can only 
conclude, therefore, that what the Court does today in the name of an investigative 
automobile search is in fact a serious departure from established Fourth Amendment 
principles.”). 
26. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 66 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“I fear that today’s close call will 
become tomorrow’s norm.”). 
27. See id. ¶ 20 (majority opinion) (allowing warrantless entry to homes when “the 
community caretaker function was reasonably exercised under the totality of the 
circumstances”); infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
28. Megan Pauline Marinos, Comment, Breaking and Entering or Community 
Caretaking? A Solution to the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON 
U. C.R. L.J. 249, 264 (2012). 
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128 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
courts, have expanded the exception to allow for the warrantless 
searches of homes.29 
This Comment explores that expansion, rejects a recent call for a 
“community caretaking warrant,” and argues that the U.S. Supreme 
Court must roll back the expansion of the community caretaking 
exception that allows warrantless searches of homes.  In Part II, this 
Comment discusses the background of the community caretaking 
exception.  It also briefly explains Fourth Amendment rights and 
discusses the development of relevant exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  In addition, Part II covers the development and expansion 
of the community caretaking exception and lays out in detail the current 
state of the law vis-à-vis the exception.  Part III makes the case that it is 
both unnecessary and unwise to expand the community caretaking 
exception to cover the warrantless entry of homes.  This analysis begins 
in Part III.A with a discussion of how the emergency doctrine eliminates 
the need for the community caretaking exception in cases of true 
emergency.  Part III.B continues with an explanation of how less-than-
emergency conditions are not sufficient to overcome the Fourth 
Amendment protections that up to now have been guaranteed to people 
in their homes.  Part III.C rejects a proposal to use “community 
caretaking warrants” as a solution to the problem of community 
caretaking expansion.30  Part III.D concludes the analysis by calling for a 
rollback of the expansion of the community caretaking exception and 
suggests how this rollback should occur in light of the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions that return property rights to the arena of 
Fourth Amendment protection jurisprudence.  Part IV makes a final 
plea to the U.S. Supreme Court to restore the Fourth Amendment 
guarantees that once protected our hearths and homes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Fourth Amendment Rights 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the “right . . . to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches.”31  This guarantee does not prohibit all searches, just those 
 
29. See infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
30. See generally Marinos, supra note 28 (proposing a “community caretaking warrant” 
as a solution). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  We are also protected from unreasonable “seizures,” id., 
but the focus of this Comment is on the expansion of the community caretaking doctrine to 
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deemed “unreasonable.”32  Warrantless, unconsented searches of a 
home are per se unreasonable—unless the search falls within one of the 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.33  However, before 
considering when a search is “unreasonable,” and thus prohibited, one 
must first look at what is meant by a “search.” 
When police34 are simply observing, they are not searching.35  
Something more is required in order for their actions to constitute a 
search.36  Prior to the mid-twentieth century, Fourth Amendment 
protections were rooted in and aimed toward the protection of rights in 
property.37  In the past, like today, when the police physically entered a 
home without consent, such an entry was a search.38  The material nature 
of the thing being searched and whether such thing was trespassed upon 
were keys to the analysis.39  For example, in Olmstead v. United States, 
the Supreme Court upheld warrantless wiretaps of phone wires outside 
the home.40  Because there was no “actual physical invasion of [the] 
 
allow warrantless entry into homes.  Accordingly, the remainder of the discussion will focus 
on searches, particularly as they apply to homes. 
32. This concept is clear from the language of the amendment itself, which protects 
against “unreasonable searches.”  Id.  Some searches, therefore, are impliedly reasonable and 
thus allowed under the amendment. 
33. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(b) (5th ed. 2012) (“[I]t [is] ‘a 
“basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without 
a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980))). 
34. For purposes of this Comment, “police,” when not mentioned in the facts of a 
particular case, refers to law enforcement or law enforcement officers in general. 
35. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“[M]ere visual observation does 
not constitute a search.”). 
36. See id. at 950 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
37. The Fourth Amendment’s focus on protecting property rights is clear from the text 
of the amendment itself, which guarantees people the right “to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects,” and requires that warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis 
added).  As the Court noted in Jones, this qualifying language “would have been superfluous” 
if there was not a “close connection” between the amendment and property.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
at 949.  Moreover, in Jones, the Court stated that its “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was 
tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”  Id. 
38. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b) (5th ed. 2012) (“It is beyond 
question, therefore, that an unconsented police entry . . . into a residential unit . . . constitutes 
a search . . . .”). 
39. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to 
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of 
material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”). 
40. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.  Perhaps the Court had trouble grappling with the 
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house,”41 and telephone conversations are not tangible things, the Court 
reasoned that the wiretaps were not searches.42  This focus on the 
physical nature of the place or thing being searched shifted drastically 
with Katz v. United States.43 
In Katz, the FBI attached a listening device to a phone booth in Los 
Angeles.44  Charles Katz used that phone booth to violate federal law by 
placing wagers to others in Miami and Boston.45  The listening device 
allowed FBI agents to hear Katz’s side of the conversations without 
them physically entering the phone booth.46  In overturning Katz’s 
conviction, the Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people—and not simply ‘areas,’” and held that the Amendment’s reach 
“cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure.”47  After Katz, a search was defined as a 
government intrusion on an area where a person has a subjective 
“expectation of privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”48 
Under the “reasonable expectation” standard, the level of protection 
provided by the Fourth Amendment varies with individual privacy 
expectations.49  For example, in New York v. Class, the “less substantial” 
 
enormity of how to apply the amendment to the relatively new technology of the telephone, 
which was invented only fifty years before Olmstead was decided.  Id. at 465 (“The language 
of the Amendment [cannot] be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching 
to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office.”).  The Court also mentions both the 
telegraph, which was still in use at the time, and telephone messages in its analysis.  Id. at 464. 
41. Id. at 466. 
42. Id. at 464. 
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that the 
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions 
that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”).  The 
seeds of this shift were sown in Justice Brandeis’ dissent to the Olmstead decision.  Olmstead, 
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government 
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
45. Id.; Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 130–32 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
46. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49. 
47. Id. at 353. 
48. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan explained how this new standard 
could protect some but not all “objects, activities, or statements” that take place in a home.  
Id. (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, 
activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ 
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”). 
49. See LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 2.1(b). 
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expectation of privacy in an automobile allowed a police officer to reach 
inside Benigno Class’s auto to move papers that obscured its VIN tag.50  
However, individual privacy expectations reach their zenith in the 
home, which is “accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment 
protections.”51  In United States v. United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, the U.S. Supreme Court again made this 
point while bridging the gap between the “physical trespass” and 
“reasonable expectation” standards when it observed that “[t]hough 
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private 
speech from unreasonable surveillance.”52 
The reasonable expectation standard dominated Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence until two recent Supreme Court decisions re-
emphasized the property roots of the Fourth Amendment.53  In United 
States v. Jones, FBI agents attached a GPS monitoring device to Antoine 
Jones’s Jeep Grand Cherokee and tracked his movements over a 
twenty-eight-day period.54  The majority in Jones ignored the 
government’s argument that Jones did not have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in the underbody of his Jeep and held that 
attaching the GPS device was a physical intrusion and, thus, a search 
that violated the Fourth Amendment.55  In noting that “the Katz 
 
50. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 108, 111–12 (1986) (“A citizen does not surrender 
all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.”); Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).  “[A] motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than 
in his home,” Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (citing Class, 475 U.S. at 112–13), however, the “interest 
[in his vehicle] is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection.”  Id. 
(citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)). 
51. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). 
52. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
53. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); LAFAVE, supra note 38, 
§ 2.1(e) (“While the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States seemed to sound the 
death knell for the pre-Katz ‘trespass’ approach to determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s coverage, over fifty years later, in United States v. Jones, the trespass doctrine 
re-emerged as an alternate theory to the Katz expectation-of-privacy approach.”(footnotes 
omitted)); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013) (holding that the 
government’s use of forensic narcotic dogs in the curtilage of a home was a physical intrusion 
and thus a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
54. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
55. Id. at 949–50 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)) (“The Government contends that . . . Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ in the area of the Jeep accessed by Government agents . . . .  But we need not address 
the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall 
with the Katz formulation.”). 
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132 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test,” the Court made it clear that 
while the trespassory test may have been down for a while, it was not 
out.56 
In Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court built on Jones and further 
revived the trespassory test by applying it in a case involving the search 
of a home.57  In Jardines, Miami-Dade detectives obtained a search 
warrant for Joelis Jardines’s home only after a drug-sniffing dog that 
they brought onto his front porch detected the odor of marijuana.58  
Noting that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights 
baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy,” the Court held that using drug-
sniffing police dogs on the curtilage of the home was a physical intrusion 
and thus a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.59 
A rule like the trespassory test makes for more clear-cut decisions, 
such as the decisions in the Olmstead, Jones, and Jardines cases.60  
However, Jones and Jardines are recent decisions, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has “long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness’”—which is a standard and not a rule.61  In general, 
standards allow for less certain and more varied outcomes than rules.62  
 
56. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.  The Court further clarifies this notion in a footnote: “A 
trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is 
done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is 
achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.”  Id. at 951 n.5. 
57. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417–18 (holding that the government’s use of a drug-sniffing 
dog in the curtilage of a home was a physical intrusion and thus a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
58. Id. at 1413. 
59. Id. at 1417–18. 
60. See supra notes 40, 53, 57 and accompanying text. 
61. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 
250 (1991)). 
62. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1187 (1989) (encouraging appellate judges to avoid standards in favor of rules where 
possible); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1707, 1723 (1996) (book review) (“[J]udges applying the increasingly malleable 
standard of reasonableness can adopt whatever policies they prefer.”).  Professor Sullivan 
explains that legal standards allow for more flexibility:  “A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it 
binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited 
triggering facts,” whereas “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse 
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact 
situation.”  Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
58 (1992).  Professor Sullivan goes on to note that standards “giv[e] the decisionmaker more 
discretion than do rules.”  Id. at 58–59. 
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This characteristic is especially evident in the reasonableness standard,63 
which is often referred to as a “malleable standard.”64  Unfortunately, 
this malleability can work both for and against those who seek the 
protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.65 
In Katz, reasonableness was used to expand people’s rights under 
the Fourth Amendment, whereas the trespassory test would have 
limited them.66  Like metal, which is considered malleable if it can be 
“hammered, pounded, or pressed into various shapes without 
breaking,”67 the reasonable expectation of privacy standard has been 
hammered, pounded, and pressed so much that the government felt 
confident arguing in Jones that the standard should now allow the very 
 
63. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no 
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts 
and circumstances.”). 
64. Legal scholars and jurists alike agree that reasonableness is a malleable standard: 
Reasonableness, then, is not a definite, arithmetic, objective quality that is 
independent of aims and values. It is a concept that is considerably more subtle, 
complex, malleable, and mysterious than the simplistic model of human 
decisionmaking relied upon by those who accept at face value the “reasonableness” 
or “rationality” of conduct that not only expresses controversial moral and political 
judgments but that also expresses deep-seated, perhaps unconscious, affections, 
fears, and aversions. 
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 144–45 (1997) (emphasis added).  
Quoting Circuit Judge Ferguson, Justice Marshall once referred to reasonable suspicion as 
having a “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.”  United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, 
Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 265 (1993) 
(“The decline of rules in fourth amendment theory is exemplified by a number of recent cases 
in which the Court determines the constitutionality of government conduct by resorting to a 
malleable ‘objective’ test of reasonableness viewed from the police officer’s perspective.”); 
Eugene D. Bryant, Note, Snoop Dogs: An Analysis of Narcotics Canine Sniffs of Storage 
Units Under the Fourth Amendment, 40 GA. L. REV. 1209, 1243 (2006) (“While the 
reasonableness test is malleable and subject to various interpretations by judges in different 
jurisdictions, the courts are not alien to discretionary tests.  The Supreme Court has inquired 
into reasonableness since the [Terry v. Ohio] decision in 1968.”); Garth Thomas, Note, 
Random Suspicionless Drug Testing: Are Students No Longer Afforded Fourth Amendment 
Protections?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 821, 848–49 (2002–2003) (“[T]he Court’s deviation from 
the warrant requirement to the ‘reasonableness’ approach to Fourth Amendment 
interpretation has provided school districts with a malleable solution devoid of individualized 
suspicion.”). 
65. See supra note 62. 
66. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
67. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 870 (Michael Agnes & David B. 
Guralnik eds., 4th ed. 2002). 
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intrusion it first forbade in Katz.68  Are the rights evaluated and 
protected by the reasonableness standard malleable as well?  Jones 
demonstrated that Fourth Amendment rights have not been broken.69  
However, those rights have proven to be as malleable as the 
reasonableness standard.70  The various shapes into which they have 
been beaten make up the exceptions to the warrant requirement, some 
of which this Comment will now explore. 
B. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
Over time, the courts have developed various exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.71  This Comment focuses on the community 
caretaking exception and its expansion to allow warrantless home 
searches.  It examines only those exceptions that relate to the 
community caretaking exception: the emergency doctrine, 
administrative warrants, and, of course, community caretaking itself. 
1. The Emergency Doctrine Exception 
At 3 a.m. on July 23, 2000, Brigham City police officers, responding 
to a loud noise complaint, observed a melee through the windows of the 
 
68. See supra note 55.  In Katz, a device was placed on the exterior of a phone booth to 
listen to conversations.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).  In Jones, a device 
was placed on the exterior of a vehicle to track its movements.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 948 (2012).  In Katz, the reasonableness standard was used to protect against such an 
intrusion, whereas in Jones, the government urged that same standard be used to allow such 
an intrusion.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  A mere forty-five years after 
Katz, a situation very similar to the one that gave rise to the new standard and its 
accompanying protections could have been left outside those very protections by the standard 
that created them.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51.  “Like the Ouroboros swallowing its tail, 
[the reasonableness standard] has ingested its own original justification.”  Youngblood v. 
West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 874 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51. 
70. See Cloud, supra note 64, at 265. 
71. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (finding an exception where 
“voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, 
or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises” (citations 
omitted)); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 121, 130 N.W.2d 264, 267 (1964) (finding an 
exception where “the person freely and intelligently gives his unequivocal and specific 
consent to the search, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, actual or implied”); State v. 
Stewart, 2011 WI App 152, ¶ 24, 337 Wis. 2d 618, 807 N.W.2d 15, review denied, 2012 WI 34, 
339 Wis. 2d 737, 810 N.W.2d 223 (2012) (“One such exception applies when, incident to a 
lawful arrest, police search a vehicle when ‘it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”’” (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
343 (2009))). 
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home, which they subsequently entered.72  The melee involved four 
adults, all of whom were intoxicated at the time, and a juvenile.73  The 
adults were charged with several minor offenses stemming from these 
events.74  At trial, the defendants argued that the officers’ warrantless 
entry into the home violated the Fourth Amendment and moved to 
suppress the evidence gained by the entry.75  In an “odd flyspeck of a 
case,” the suppression motion made it to the U.S. Supreme Court,76 
which succinctly defined—and reiterated—the emergency doctrine.77  
The Court held that “law enforcement officers [are permitted to] enter a 
home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured 
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”78  Six years 
later, in Ryburn v. Huff, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that its recent 
cases on the emergency doctrine mean “the Fourth Amendment permits 
an officer to enter a residence if the officer has a reasonable basis for 
concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence.”79 
 
72. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400–01 (2006). 
73. Id. at 401. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
77. Id. at 403–04 (majority opinion).  This is not to be confused with the “emergency 
doctrine” (sometimes referred to as the “sudden emergency doctrine”) from the common law 
of torts, which applies in cases of negligence.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 
(1965) (“In determining whether conduct is negligent toward another, the fact that the actor 
is confronted with a sudden emergency which requires rapid decision is a factor in 
determining the reasonable character of his choice of action.”).  Both doctrines are similar in 
that they take emergency circumstances into account when evaluating, after the fact, the 
reasonableness of a person’s actions in a given situation. 
78. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.  The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in 
1978.  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“We do not question the right of the 
police to respond to emergency situations.”). 
79. Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990 (2012) (per curiam).  This case is of interest in 
light of the recent national focus on school shootings in the wake of the Newtown, 
Connecticut massacre.  See, e.g., Steve Vogel et al., Killer’s Motive Still a Mystery, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1.  In Ryburn, officers were responding to a home to investigate a 
rumored threat from a student to “shoot up” his school.  Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 988.  When the 
police arrived at the home to inquire about the threat, they encountered strange behavior 
from the student’s mother, which prompted them to enter the home.  Id. at 988–89.  The 
officers did not conduct a search of the home or the occupants, but their actions were 
subsequently challenged in a § 1983 action.  Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 988–89; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2006).  The Court issued a forceful per curiam opinion in which they reversed the 
Ninth Circuit and entered a judgment in favor of the officers.  Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 988, 990–
92 (“No decision of this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even 
roughly comparable to those present in this case.  On the contrary, some of our opinions may 
be read as pointing in the opposition direction.”). 
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Also known as the “emergency aid” exception, the emergency 
doctrine is often confused with the “exigent circumstances” exception.80  
The emergency aid exception focuses on the protection of people, 
whereas the exigent circumstances exception focuses on the protection 
of evidence.81  This distinction is important because the original 
formulation of the community caretaking exception involves police 
actions totally divorced from investigation.82  In the early years of its 
development, the emergency aid exception took a similar approach: 
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without 
either an arrest or a search warrant to preserve life or property, 
to render first aid and assistance, or to conduct a general inquiry 
into an unsolved crime, provided they have reasonable grounds 
to believe that there is an urgent need for such assistance and 
protective action, or to promptly launch a criminal investigation 
involving a substantial threat of imminent danger to either life, 
health, or property, and provided, further, that they do not enter 
with an accompanying intent to either arrest or search.83 
This approach is reflected in the three-part Mitchell test,84 which was 
first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals: 
 (1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that 
there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their 
assistance for the protection of life or property. 
 (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to 
arrest and seize evidence. 
 
80. See State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1037 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he exigent 
circumstances exception is distinct from the emergency exception, and the two are often 
confused . . . .”); MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, No. 12-12061-RGS, 2013 WL 2303760, at 
*5 (D. Mass. May 24, 2013) (noting a “widely-shared confusion between and among the 
distinct doctrines of community caretaking, emergency aid, and exigent circumstances”); 
State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 26 n.8, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1001 (2011); Isaac J. Colunga, When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Traditional 
Function, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 53 (2010) (“[I]n applying the emergency aid exception, some 
courts consider it a variation of the exigent circumstances exception . . . .”). 
81. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“[A] search warrant [is] 
unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; 
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again 
if a warrant must be obtained.  Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.”). 
82. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
83. Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 426 (1973) (emphasis added). 
84. People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976), abrogated by Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
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 (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating 
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place 
to be searched.85 
The second prong ensures that the “protection of human life or property 
in imminent danger must be the motivation for the search rather than the 
desire to apprehend a suspect or gather evidence for use in a criminal 
proceeding.”86  Some courts have adopted this test to evaluate law 
enforcement’s use of the emergency aid exception87 but most 
jurisdictions have not.88  Although state courts are free to maintain the 
motive requirement articulated in the Mitchell test, the U.S. Supreme 
Court eliminated that option for federal courts in the Brigham City v. 
Stuart decision in 2006.89  Now, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, 
‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’”90 
Simply stated, the emergency aid exception says that, police do not 
need a warrant to enter a home to provide help to the injured or prevent 
further injury in an emergency, even if the police are also there to 
investigate crime or detain suspects, as long as there is an objectively 
reasonable basis for the actions taken by police.91  For example, in 
Brigham City, the police did not need a warrant to enter the home to 
stop people from being injured in a fight, even if they were also planning 
on arresting some of those participating in the fight.92 
2. Administrative Warrants 
As the name implies, the administrative warrant is not, strictly 
speaking, an exception to the warrant requirement.  Under the Fourth 
 
85. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609. 
86. Id. at 610 (emphasis added). 
87. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 6.6(a) n.29 (“Several other courts follow this three-point 
test.”). 
88. John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth 
Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433, 533 (1999) (“In fact, [the 
Mitchell test] has been in existence for more than twenty years, but it has not been utilized in 
a majority of jurisdictions.”). 
89. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402–04 (noting that, when discussing the subjective 
motivation requirement, “[o]ur cases have repeatedly rejected this approach”). 
90. Id. at 404 (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
91. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402–05. 
92. Id. at 405. 
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Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”93  In 
1967, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the probable cause element of 
the warrant requirement as it applied to administrative rather than 
criminal law.94  In Camara, the appellant, Roland Camara, challenged 
the constitutionality of a San Francisco housing ordinance that 
authorized warrantless health and safety inspections of residential 
properties without probable cause to believe the housing code was being 
violated.95  The Court held that these inspections “are significant 
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,” and 
that they could not be conducted without a warrant.96  The Court then 
examined “whether some other accommodation between public need 
and individual rights is essential” in these types of cases.97 
The Court looked at what would constitute probable cause within 
the context of a code inspection.98  Before 1967, the Fourth 
Amendment’s “reasonableness clause had been used to excuse the 
absence of a warrant, but not the lack of probable cause.”99  After 
stating “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard,” the Court held 
that “[i]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then 
there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.”100  
Now, instead of probable cause making a search reasonable, 
reasonableness makes for probable cause.101 
3. The Community Caretaking Exception 
Community caretaking by itself is not an exception to the warrant 
requirement; rather, it is a description of what police do when they are 
 
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
94. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“We may agree that a routine 
inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the 
typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.”). 
95. Id. at 525–27; Camara v. Mun. Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965). 
96. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 535 (“In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable—and thus 
in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the 
need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code 
enforcement.”). 
99. Robert Berkley Harper, Has the Replacement of “Probable Cause” with “Reasonable 
Suspicion” Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 13, 
20 (1988). 
100. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 
101. See Harper, supra note 99, at 21. 
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not investigating crime.102  Police regularly perform community 
caretaking activities to help people in danger, to preserve property, or to 
“create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.”103  Police 
also engage in community caretaking when they respond to noise 
complaints, mediate non-criminal disputes, assist the “ill or injured,” 
“[take] lost property into their possession,” remove abandoned 
property, or are called on to act as surrogates for a variety of society’s 
usual caregivers.104  A police officer’s community caretaking activity 
becomes an exception to the warrant requirement if the officer has to 
perform a search in order to complete the caretaking activity.105 
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized this exception in Cady v. 
Dombrowski.106  The Court held that searches made while performing 
community caretaking functions do not require warrants and are subject 
only to the reasonableness standard.107  At the time, the Court focused 
on the “constitutional difference between houses and cars” when it 
ruled that automobile searches are a “partial exception” to the warrant 
requirement.108  As initially conceived by the Court, the motives of the 
police engaged in community caretaking are supposed to be “totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”109  Since Cady, courts have 
expanded the exception to allow warrantless searches of homes despite 
mixed motives on the part of law enforcement.110 
C. Community Caretaking Expands 
In the years since the inception of the community caretaking 
exception, which was initially limited to searches of automobiles,111 both 
 
102. See Livingston, supra note 14, at 271–72. 
103. Id. at 272 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-2.2 (1980)). 
104. Livingston, supra note 14, at 272. 
105. For example, an officer checking on a sleeping motorist at the side of the road may 
discover a gun at the motorist’s feet.  People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ill. 1990); see 
also infra Part II.C. 
106. See supra notes 1–6, 11–12 and accompanying text. 
107. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447–48 (1973). 
108. Id. at 439 (“Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, ‘for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference 
between houses and cars.’” (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970))). 
109. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. 
110. See, e.g., State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 16–27, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
111. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441–43, 447–48. 
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federal circuit and state supreme courts have expanded the community 
caretaking exception to allow the warrantless searches of homes.112  At 
least one court has also expanded the motives allowed by police for the 
community caretaking searches and now allows for mixed motives or 
pretextual community caretaking.113  The discussion that follows 
examines, in chronological order, the cases that led the various courts to 
expand the exception.  This Comment will first look at the federal 
courts. 
1. Federal Circuits 
Three federal circuits, the Sixth Circuit in 1996, the Fourth Circuit in 
2001, and the Eighth Circuit in 2006, have expanded the community 
caretaking exception. 
a. Sixth Circuit 
In the pre-dawn hours of May 22, 1994, two Canton, Ohio, police 
officers were investigating a loud noise complaint at the home of 
Donald Rohrig.114  The officers entered the home through an unlocked 
door after receiving no answer when they knocked on the door and 
tapped on all the first floor windows.115  During their efforts to locate 
Rohrig, they discovered a sophisticated marijuana grow operation in the 
basement.116  Rohrig, facing federal drug charges, moved to suppress the 
evidence on the basis that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights when they entered his home without a warrant.117  When the Sixth 
Circuit heard his appeal, the court held that the warrantless entry of a 
residence was justified under the community caretaking exception.118  
The court was “simply unable to identify any unreasonable conduct on 
the part of the . . . officers,”119 and concluded that the government’s 
interest in quieting the loud music was sufficient to justify the 
warrantless entry of Rohrig’s home.120 
 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th Cir. 1996); State v. 
Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 286–87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
113. See infra Part II.C.2.e; infra notes 264–68 and accompanying text. 
114. See Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1509. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1510. 
118. Id. at 1523. 
119. Id. at 1524. 
120. Id. at 1522. 
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In a more recent case, the Sixth Circuit reined in the expansion 
somewhat by maintaining Cady’s distinction between law enforcement 
and community caretaking, and noting: “The community caretaking 
function of the police cannot apply where . . . there is significant 
suspicion of criminal activity.”121 
b. Fourth Circuit 
In 1999, Officer Michael Peddle, based partially on lies told to him 
by a detective who had been attempting to serve Britt Phillips with a 
subpoena, entered Britt Phillip’s home through an open front door to 
check on his welfare.122  Phillips brought a § 1983 action123 against Peddle 
alleging that Peddle violated his Fourth Amendment rights when Peddle 
entered his home.124  Affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment against Phillips, the Fourth Circuit found that “Peddle did not 
violate any clearly established law when he entered the home” because 
he “was acting under the aegis of the community caretaker doctrine.”125  
The court reasoned that Peddle’s warrantless home entry was allowable 
because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Virginia Supreme 
Court have “established law refuting the applicability of the community 
caretaker doctrine to an entry into a residence.”126  The Fourth Circuit, 
relying heavily on precedent from the Sixth Circuit and the Virginia 
Court of Appeals, preserved, as those courts did, the totally divorced 
standard from Cady.127 
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit clarified its community caretaking 
jurisprudence in Hunsberger v. Wood when it explained that community 
caretaking “is in no sense an open-ended grant of discretion that will 
justify a warrantless search whenever an officer can point to some 
 
121. United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2003) (expressing concern 
over the purity of DEA agents’ motives for investigating a water leak in an apartment where 
sparse furniture, smells, and small leaves had been reported). 
122. Phillips v. Peddle, 7 F. App’x 175, 176–77 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Although some of the 
facts that Detective Russell presented were untrue, this was the scene that Detective Russell 
presented to Officer Peddle.”). 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
124. Phillips, 7 F. App’x at 177. 
125. Id. at 177–78, 180. 
126. Id. at 179–80. 
127. See id. at 178–80 (citing United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Wood v. Commonwealth (Wood II), 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc); 
Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 529–30 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)). 
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interest unrelated to the detection of crime.”128  In Hunsberger, police 
entered a home without a warrant to search for a missing minor and 
suspected vandals because neighbors mistakenly thought the 
homeowners were on vacation.129  In a subsequent § 1983 action,130 the 
court held that the community caretaking exception did not apply to the 
search because the police were not following “a standard policy that 
could be classified as community caretaking.”131  Because community 
caretaking focuses on functions more than circumstances, the court 
wanted to see a programmatic basis for an officer’s actions, “such as the 
policy of locating weapons in towed cars in Dombrowski.”132  In the 
Fourth Circuit, although community caretaking functions allow police 
into homes without a warrant, those functions must be policy driven and 
separate from crime detection and investigation.133 
c. Eighth Circuit 
In U.S. v. Quezada, the Eighth Circuit held that a sheriff’s deputy 
attempting to serve papers was acting as a community caretaker when 
he entered Tiffany Giannone’s apartment without a warrant and 
discovered Giannone’s houseguest on the floor sleeping on top of a 
shotgun.134  The deputy had knocked on the door, which, because it was 
unlatched, opened a bit.135  Through the opening, the deputy could see a 
light and hear a television.136  He announced his presence and received 
no answer.137  He entered the apartment with his weapon drawn, 
whereupon he saw a pair of legs on the floor, protruding from the 
 
128. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009).  The court also 
distinguished community caretaking from the emergency aid doctrine: “The community 
caretaking doctrine requires a court to look at the function performed by a police officer, 
while the emergency exception requires an analysis of the circumstances to determine 
whether an emergency requiring immediate action existed.  Thus, as the district court noted, 
the doctrines have different ‘intellectual underpinning[s].’”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Hunsberger v. Wood, 564 F. Supp. 2d 559, 567 (W.D. Va. 2008), rev’d, 570 F.3d 546 
(4th Cir. 2009)). 
129. Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 549–51. 
130. Id. at 552; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
131. Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 554. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. 
134. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 2006). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
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bedroom.138  The legs belonged to the defendant, Christopher Quezada, 
who was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm—the 
shotgun upon which he was sleeping.139  In allowing the search, the court 
held “[a] police officer may enter a residence without a warrant as a 
community caretaker where the officer has a reasonable belief that an 
emergency exists requiring his or her attention.”140  The court noted 
concerns about officers using their caretaking responsibilities as pretext 
to gain entry to a home but found those concerns could be addressed by 
the emergency nature of this exception, although it did not decide the 
issue.141 
2. State Courts 
An increasing number of state courts, some following the lead of the 
federal circuits, and others following the lead of other states before 
them, have expanded the community caretaking exception to allow for 
the warrantless entry of homes. 
a. Maryland 
On Thanksgiving Day 1997, a Calvert County sheriff’s deputy 
responded to an anonymous call about an open basement door at Carol 
and James Alexander’s home.142  Although there were “no signs of a 
forcible entry” and the family dog started barking only after the deputy 
knocked on the door, the deputy and a backup entered the basement 
and found it in “disarray.”143  While searching the rest of the home for 
“possible intruders,” the deputies discovered some marijuana—in what 
they claimed was in plain view144—on a shelf in a walk-in closet of the 
 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1006–07. 
140. Id. at 1007 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1978)). 
141. Quezada, 448 F.3d at 1007–08 (“But we do not have to decide the legal relevance, if 
any, that the subjective intent of the officer in the present case might have because the district 
court found on an ample record that Deputy Ruth entered the apartment to investigate a 
possible emergency situation.”). 
142. State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 276–77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
143. Id. at 278. 
144. Id.  The court did not question that the marijuana was in plain view.  Id. at 287 (“It 
was only when looking into a walk-in closet in the master bedroom, a place where an intruder 
could well have been hiding, that the officers saw marijuana on a shelf in plain view.”).  The 
court further asserts that “[t]here was saliently missing from the circumstances of this case 
any possibility that the two officers were engaging in any sort of a subterfuge.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  However, an argument can be made that the evidence was not truly in plain sight if 
officers could only have discovered the evidence after making their way from the basement to 
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master bedroom.145  In deciding the case, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals first established that reasonableness, not probable cause, was 
the standard by which to judge such entries.146  In so doing, the court 
expanded community caretaking to allow for warrantless home entries 
and subsequently found that “[w]hat the officers did in this case was the 
quintessence of the reasonable performance of their community 
caretaking function.”147 
b. Virginia 
In 1994, the Virginia Court of Appeals first recognized the 
community caretaking exception from Cady.148  A year later, in 
Commonwealth v. Waters, the court clarified that the exception was not 
limited to automobiles.149  Although the defendant in Waters was 
searched on the street, the door to warrantless home searches was 
opened.150  In 1997, the court walked through that door in Wood v. 
Commonwealth (Wood I) when it applied “the community caretaker 
doctrine to justify the warrantless entry into and investigative search of 
the second floor of [Wood’s] home.”151  While the court found that 
“little, if any, distinction exists in Virginia law between the 
circumstances governing the application of the community caretaker 
doctrine and those governing the application of the ‘emergency’ 
exception,” it did treat the exceptions separately and thus does not limit 
the application of community caretaking to emergency situations.152  
 
the master bedroom and opening the closet door.  See id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 284–85 (“When the police cross a threshold not in their criminal investigatory 
capacity but as part of their community caretaking function, it is clear that the standard for 
assessing the Fourth Amendment propriety of such conduct is whether they possessed a 
reasonable basis for doing what they did.”). 
147. Id. at 287. 
148. Barrett v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc) 
(“Citing Cady v. Dombrowski, the Commonwealth argues that officers may conduct 
investigative seizures in the routine execution of community caretaking functions, totally 
divorced from the detection or investigation of crime, so long as those seizures are 
reasonable.  We agree.” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 462 S.E.2d 109 (Va. 
1995). 
149. Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that “no 
language in Barrett or Cady restricts an officer’s community caretaking actions to incidents 
involving automobiles”). 
150. Id. at 528–30. 
151. See Wood v. Commonwealth (Wood I), 484 S.E.2d 627, 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), 
rev’d, 497 S.E.2d 484 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc). 
152. See Wood I, 484 S.E.2d at 630–31. 
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Under the community caretaking exception, “[a]n officer may take 
appropriate action . . . where the officer maintains a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion . . . that such action is necessary.”153  The court 
reversed its decision a year later, but the majority did not explicitly hold 
that the community caretaking doctrine could not apply to warrantless 
home entry, merely that it did not apply given the facts of that case.154  
One thing that the court was absolutely clear on in the Wood II decision 
was that it was maintaining the totally divorced standard from Cady.155 
c. California 
On Christmas Day 1996, Richmond, California, police officers were 
called to the home of Andre Ray because its door had been “open all 
day,” and the home was “a shambles inside.”156  Although the door was 
open only two feet and “there were no signs of forced entry,” the 
officers entered the home, where they discovered a large quantity of 
cocaine and money.157  Citing, inter alia, State v. Alexander,158 the 
Supreme Court of California affirmed the court of appeal and expanded 
the community caretaking exception in California.159  However, the court 
placed some limits on the expansion160: (1) officers’ search of the home 
must be “narrowly delimited by the known facts” that gave rise to the 
entry,161 and (2) trial courts must judge officers’ credibility and 
 
153. Id. at 631. 
154. Wood II, 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc) (“We, therefore, hold 
that the warrantless entry by the officers into the second floor of Wood’s residence was not 
justified by any ‘community caretaker’ function. . . .  Nothing in this record supports an 
extension of its application to a warrantless intrusion into Wood’s upstairs bedroom under the 
circumstances proved in this record.”).  This was also enough to convince the Fourth Circuit, 
which relied on this holding when it expanded the community caretaking exception.  See 
supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
155. Wood II, 497 S.E.2d at 487 (“[O]n these facts, the officers’ intrusion into the room 
on the second floor of the home was not totally divorced from investigating criminal activity 
and acquiring evidence and, therefore, could not be considered a caretaking function.”); see 
also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
156. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal. 1999). 
157. Id. at 931–32. 
158. Id. at 935–36 (“For present purposes, State v. Alexander is particularly instructive.” 
(citation omitted)). 
159. Id. at 931 (holding that under the community caretaking exception, “officers acted 
reasonably to protect the safety and security of persons and property when they briefly 
entered defendant’s residence without a warrant”). 
160. Id. at 937 (“In adopting a community caretaking exception, we emphasize two 
aspects critical to maintaining the essential constitutional balance.”). 
161. Id. 
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motivations when evaluating the reasonableness of the entry.162  With 
the second limit, the court clearly preserves Cady’s totally divorced 
standard.163 
d. South Dakota 
On April 27, 2007, a Sioux Falls, South Dakota, police officer 
responded to a call from the local gas utility concerning possible theft of 
natural gas in a residential neighborhood.164  When the officer 
approached the home from which the utility suspected gas was being 
stolen, he observed what he considered to be a “wide open, unsecured 
house”: the front glass storm door was closed and unlocked, but the 
main door behind it was open.165  He could detect a faint smell of 
ammonia, and a neighbor informed him that the occupant of the home 
had been “caught at Kmart buying Sudafed.”166  After a backup officer 
arrived, the two officers entered the home “to check to make sure 
nobody was incapacitated inside.”167  The officers found no one in the 
home but did discover evidence that methamphetamine was being 
manufactured there.168  The officers left the home, obtained and 
executed a search warrant, and arrested the homeowner, Brian 
Deneui.169  In Deneui, the Supreme Court of South Dakota noted, 
“[H]omes cannot be arbitrarily isolated from the community caretaking 
equation,” and held that the exception could justify the warrantless 
search of a home.170  However, the court preserved the totally divorced 
standard171 and distinguished the community caretaking exception from 
the emergency doctrine, which it observed “implicate[s] . . . actual 
 
162. Id. at 938 (“[T]he trial courts play a vital gatekeeper role, judging not only the 
credibility of the officers’ testimony but of their motivations.”). 
163. Id. (“Any intention of engaging in crime-solving activities will defeat the 
community caretaking exception even in cases of mixed motives.”); see also Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
164. State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 226–27 (S.D. 2009). 
165. Id. at 227. 
166. Id.  Despite these clues, the court was convinced that officers “did not suspect a 
methamphetamine lab until after [they were] inside the residence.”  Id. at 231. 
167. Id. at 227–28. 
168. Id. at 228. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 239. 
171. Id. (“[T]he police action must be apart from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of criminal evidence; and the officer should be able to articulate specific facts that, 
taken with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”). 
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emergencies.”172 
e. Wisconsin 
In 2010, relying on some of the decisions above for justification,173 
Wisconsin expanded the community caretaking exception to allow for 
the warrantless searching of homes in the Pinkard case.174  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a three-step test for this exception: 
[T]he circuit court must determine: (1) whether a search or 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has 
occurred; (2) if so, whether the police were exercising a bona fide 
community caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public 
interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the 
individual such that the community caretaker function was 
reasonably exercised within the context of a home.175 
One might think that the second prong’s “bona fide” requirement 
maintains the totally divorced standard, but it does not.176  It simply 
means “officers must be able to articulate an objectively reasonable 
belief that entry into the home is necessary to prevent harm.”177  
Wisconsin law enforcement officers may have mixed motives for a 
community caretaking search as long as the motive to protect and 
render assistance is “paramount.”178  The third prong is evaluated by 
balancing public interest in the search against the “intrusion on the 
citizen’s constitutional interest.”179  Although one of the factors balanced 
was exigency,180 the court was careful not to confuse the emergency 
 
172. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239 (emphasis added). 
173. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 20 n.6, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (relying on, 
inter alia, United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996), People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928 
(Cal. 1999), and Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) to support its 
holding that community caretaking was not limited to automobiles), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1001 (2011). 
174. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 26–28. 
175. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 29 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 
¶ 21, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598). 
176. See Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 40 (“[C]ommunity caretaker and law enforcement 
functions ‘are not mutually exclusive.’” (quoting Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 39)); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
177. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 78 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
178. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 35. 
179. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 41 (citing Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 40). 
180. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 42. 
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doctrine with the community caretaking exception.181  “The community 
caretak[ing] exception does not require the circumstances to rise to the 
level of an emergency to qualify as an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.”182 
Wisconsin’s courts are still sorting out the boundaries of the 
community caretaking exception.  The court of appeals considers the 
three-step test adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to signify that 
“warrantless entry into a residence is subjected to stricter scrutiny.”183  In 
State v. Ultsch, the court of appeals used that stricter scrutiny standard 
to hold that officers were not acting as community caretakers when they 
entered a home without a warrant looking for a suspected drunk driver 
after finding her damaged car at the end of her driveway.184  While a 
promising development, this holding did not stop officers from entering 
Juan Gracia’s home under similar circumstances.185  In that case, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the community caretaking 
exception applied to the officers’ entry of Gracia’s bedroom after Gracia 
had told the officers to “go away.”186 
3. U.S. Supreme Court 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the exception in Cady, but has 
yet to endorse the elimination of the totally divorced standard or the 
expansion from automobiles to private homes.187 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
In 1973, when the community caretaking exception was first 
recognized, it was limited to automobiles.188  Since then, the Supreme 
 
181. Id. ¶ 26 n.8 (“We have consistently maintained the appropriate distinction between 
the two exceptions . . . .”). 
182. Id. 
183. State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, ¶ 18, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505. 
184. Id. ¶¶ 2–5, 30. 
185. State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 21, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (“[S]ome of the 
facts here appear similar to those in Ultsch . . . .”). 
186. Id. at ¶¶ 28–29. 
187. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 98 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“It is noteworthy that the 
United States Supreme Court has never extended the community caretaker exception to 
justify a warrantless entry of a home.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
188. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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2013] THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION 149 
Court has not spoken on expanding the exception to homes.189  
Meanwhile, courts have fallen like dominoes as the expansion of 
community caretaking has spread through American jurisprudence.  In 
1996, the Sixth Circuit expanded the exception.190  In 1998, two states 
expanded the exception: Virginia in March,191 followed by Maryland in 
December.192  The Fourth Circuit, citing the decisions made in the Sixth 
Circuit and Virginia, expanded community caretaking in 2001.193  That 
same year, California, following Maryland’s example, expanded the 
exception.194  The Eighth Circuit expanded the exception in 2006,195 
followed by South Dakota in 2009.196  Finally, in 2010, Wisconsin, citing 
the examples of the Sixth Circuit, Virginia, and California, expanded the 
community caretaking exception to cover warrantless home searches.197 
Where expansion of the community caretaking exception to homes 
has occurred, it has happened quite rapidly.  In Wisconsin, for example, 
while the explicit expansion into homes did not occur until the Pinkard 
case thirty-seven years after the Cady decision,198 the majority in Pinkard 
relied on the decision in Bies v. State, which laid the groundwork for the 
home expansion only ten years after the Cady decision.199  In the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, the community caretaking doctrine was not 
used until 1994, but once recognized, it took only four years for a court 
to use it to justify a warrantless home entry.200 
Not only have these expansions happened quickly, but it also seems 
as if further expansion is inevitable.  The Ninth Circuit, which initially 
limited the doctrine to automobiles, recently signaled that it may be 
 
189. See supra note 187. 
190. See supra notes 112, 118 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra notes 142, 147 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 127, 158–59 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra notes 134, 140 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra notes 164, 170–72 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
199. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 22 (“While Bies did not explicitly state that a bona fide 
community caretaker function may support a warrantless home entry, it necessarily implies 
such an interpretation.”); Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977).  In Bies, an 
officer investigating reports of noise in an alley observed, through an open door to a garage, 
what he believed to be stolen goods.  Bies, 76 Wis. 2d at 460–62.  The majority in Pinkard 
notes that this warrantless entry of the curtilage of the residence implies that a warrantless 
entry of the home is allowed.  Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 22. 
200. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 79 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 79 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:58 PM 
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moving toward expansion.201  This rapid and growing expansion 
threatens to erode Fourth Amendment rights.  To counter this threat, 
this expansion must be stopped and reversed. 
Part III.A explains that the emergency doctrine is robust enough to 
allow police to enter people’s homes when help is truly needed.  Part 
III.B shows that mere exigency cannot overcome the protections 
guaranteed to people in their homes.  Part III.C analyzes why warrants 
prove to be an unworkable solution to this problem.  Finally, Part III.D 
calls for the Supreme Court to roll back the expansion of the community 
caretaking exception by applying the recently revived “physical 
intrusion” standard. 
A. Community Caretaking in Homes Is Not Needed Because of the 
Emergency Doctrine 
Unquestionably, law enforcement may enter a home to render 
assistance in a true emergency.202  That principle is the very essence of 
the emergency doctrine, perhaps best expressed in 1963, by then-Judge 
Warren Burger: 
[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a 
burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent 
a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an injured person.  The 
need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is 
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an 
exigency or emergency.203 
While community caretaking often involves some exigency, it usually 
does not involve the urgency required in emergency situations.204  Some 
courts separate exigency and emergency, reserving the emergency 
 
201. Although the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Erickson held that the community 
caretaking function “cannot itself justify a warrantless search of a private residence,” United 
States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993), a more recent decision points in a 
different direction, United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining 
that police acting as community caretakers responding to “perceived emergenc[ies]” could 
enter a residence without a warrant).  This opinion is shared by the Fourth Circuit, which 
recently interpreted Stafford as allowing warrantless searches of homes under the community 
caretaking doctrine: “[S]ome lower courts have relied on the community caretaking rationale 
in upholding warrantless searches of homes.”  Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 553 (4th 
Cir. 2009). 
202. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“We do not question the right of the 
police to respond to emergency situations.”). 
203. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
204. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine for “actual emergencies,” whereas other courts have been 
confused on this point, sometimes conflating the two.205  For example, in 
2012, the Supreme Court of Ohio referred to the “community-
caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement,”206 and in 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a 
motion for appeal to bring clarity to “state case law [that had] blurred 
the distinction between the community-caretaking and emergency-aid 
doctrines.”207  Other courts graft the emergency doctrine onto the 
community caretaking exception by applying the Mitchell test to limit 
the exception to emergency situations.208  New Mexico’s history with the 
community caretaker exception brings some clarity to this mess and 
shows that when the emergency doctrine is properly applied, the 
community caretaking exception does not need to be expanded to 
homes.209 
In 2001, the New Mexico Court of Appeals referred to “community 
caretaking” and “emergency aid” as “different 
characterizations . . . essentially of the same activity.”210  Initially, the 
 
205. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
206. State v. Dunn, 964 N.E.2d 1037, 1042 (Ohio 2012).  In the same case, the court 
implies that “community caretaking,” “exigent circumstances,” and “emergency” are similar, 
if not the same: 
In State v. Applegate, this court upheld a warrantless entry into a residence by police 
officers who, while responding to a report of domestic violence, heard sounds 
coming from inside the residence indicative of violence.  Although we did not use 
the term “community caretaking,” but rather “exigent circumstances,” we held that 
the warrantless entry was certainly justified by the officers’ reasonable belief that 
entering the residence was necessary to investigate an emergency threatening life 
and limb. 
Id. at 1041–42. (citation omitted).  The court further conflates community caretaking and the 
emergency doctrine by claiming that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the community 
caretaking exception in Mincey v. Arizona, which is actually the case that gave rise to the 
emergency doctrine.  Id. at 1041 (“The United States Supreme Court further elaborated on 
the community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in 
Mincey v. Arizona . . . .”); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); Mary 
Elisabeth Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth 
Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 331 (1999) (“In Mincey v. Arizona, the 
Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement for emergencies.”). 
207. State v. Vargas, 63 A.3d 175, 188 (N.J. 2013) (rejecting an expansion of the 
community caretaking exception to allow warrantless searches of homes). 
208. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance 
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1503–04 
(2009).  For an explanation of the Mitchell test, see supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
209. See infra notes 211–16 and accompanying text. 
210. State v. Nemeth, 23 P.3d 936, 943 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), overruled by State v. Ryon, 
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court held that the community caretaking function “can properly take its 
place in our jurisprudence as an exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement.”211  The court allowed for warrantless searches of a 
home under the community caretaking exception as long as police 
officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” and officers are “not 
engaged in crime-solving activities.”212  Although the court of appeals 
signaled a cautious approach to the expansion,213 the New Mexico 
Supreme Court rolled it back just four years later.214  The court was 
concerned that “Nemeth does not convey the urgency required to make 
a warrantless intrusion into a home, even to provide emergency 
assistance, reasonable.”215 
The court distinguished between the emergency doctrine, which it 
held applies to personal residences, and “[t]he Cady community 
caretaker or public servant doctrine,” which it held applied primarily to 
vehicles.216  It rejected community caretaking as a basis to enter a home 
without a warrant and held that police “may [only] enter a home 
without a warrant or consent pursuant to the emergency assistance 
doctrine.”217  The court also held that officers’ “actions must be in good 
faith . . . for a purpose consistent with community caretaking, rather 
than as a pretext for investigating criminal activity or searching for 
incriminating evidence” and adopted the Mitchell test for evaluating 
such entries.218 
Courts truly seeking to limit warrantless home searches to 
emergency situations would do well to follow the lead of the New 
Mexico Supreme Court.  Such searches should be evaluated using the 
emergency aid doctrine—not community caretaking—because “only a 
genuine emergency will justify entering and searching a home without a 
 
108 P.3d 1032 (N.M. 2005). 
211. Nemeth, 23 P.3d at 944. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 945 (“[L]aw enforcement officials have no carte blanche to enter homes to 
investigate circumstances of suspected criminal activity under a guise or pretext of community 
caretaking pursuits.”). 
214. State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1041–42 (N.M. 2005) (“The decision in Nemeth to 
conflate the emergency assistance doctrine with the broader community caretaker exception 
and hold that officers were merely performing a welfare check or ‘public service’ is 
understandable, but we are not persuaded the decision is appropriate.”). 
215. Id. at 1041 (emphasis added). 
216. Id. at 1043. 
217. Id. at 1048. 
218. Id. at 1044. 
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warrant and without consent or knowledge.”219  As this Comment 
examines below, anything less is not sufficient to guard that which 
stands at the core of people’s Fourth Amendment rights—their homes.220 
B. Non-Emergency Exigencies Cannot Overcome the Protection 
Afforded to Homes 
An exception founded on the “constitutional difference between 
houses and [automobiles]”221 should not now be used to justify 
warrantless entry into homes, which are “accorded the full range of 
Fourth Amendment protections.”222  “[The] physical entry of the home is 
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed . . . .”223  Accordingly, when “officers are not responding to an 
emergency,” searching a home without a warrant requires “compelling 
reasons” and “exceptional circumstances.”224  Unlike homes, 
automobiles have an “ambulatory character” and “the extent of police-
citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than 
police-citizen contact in a home.”225  Thus, people have a “lesser 
expectation of privacy in an automobile than in [a] home,”226 where they 
have the greatest expectation of privacy.227  However, this distinction 
seems to be lost on jurisdictions where the community caretaking 
exception is not limited to emergency situations.228 
Warrantless searches in those jurisdictions are justified with a blend 
 
219. Id. at 1043 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)). 
220. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
221. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). 
222. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). 
223. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
224. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). 
225. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441–42. 
226. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 56, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (quoting State 
v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 169 n.4, 417 N.W.2d 411, 414 n.4 (Ct. App. 1987) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
227. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“But when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, the home is first among equals.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) 
(“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings.  In none is 
the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical 
dimensions of an individual’s home . . . .”); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no expectation of privacy more . . . demanding of 
constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of 
our homes . . . .”). 
228. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text. 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 81 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 81 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:58 PM 
154 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
of exigency229 and reasonableness, which should not be sufficient to 
overcome the heightened constitutional protections that people enjoy in 
their homes.230  In California, community caretaking searches must be 
prompted by exigency, but law enforcement’s actions are judged against 
the malleable reasonableness standard.231  In Wisconsin, the 
reasonableness of officers’ exercise of their community caretaking 
function is determined with a balancing test that considers, among other 
things, exigency.232  In Maryland, the exigency required is that law 
enforcement must be protecting people, property, or both.233  The 
standard for evaluating officers’ actions is “whether they possessed a 
reasonable basis for doing what they did.”234  These standards offer the 
promise of sufficient protection, but they are often used to justify a 
search when circumstances are, in reality, less than exigent.235 
Consider, for example, Pinkard, the case Wisconsin used to expand 
community caretaking, where police received a report that the 
occupants of a home were sleeping near illegal drugs, but officers had no 
indication that the occupants were in need of medical attention or other 
assistance.236  If the police were concerned for the occupants, that 
concern was not reflected in their actions; the police gang unit, not an 
ambulance, was dispatched to check on the occupants.237  It was not until 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the case that the concern that the 
occupants might be suffering a drug overdose was discussed as a 
possible exigency—raised not by the police but by the court.238  In a 
more egregious example, one law enforcement officer lied to another to 
 
229. Recall that the exigencies discussed here are not the same as the exigencies in a 
situation where a crime is being investigated.  That “exigent circumstances” exception is a 
separate issue from community caretaking.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra Part II.C.2.c.  This combination of lower standards makes the exception 
subject to abuse by law enforcement.  See Jennifer Fink, Note, People v. Ray: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Community Caretaking Exception, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 135, 152 (2000) 
(“The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is intended to curb the potential for abuses 
of discretion by police officers, and the community caretaking exception will likely defeat this 
critical purpose when applied in the context of a private residence.”). 
232. See supra notes 173–82 and accompanying text. 
233. State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 284 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
234. Id. at 285. 
235. See, e.g., United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1006–08 (8th Cir. 2006). 
236. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
238. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 90–91, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Bradley, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
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create the exigent circumstances later used to justify the search that 
served as the basis for expanding the exception for the Fourth Circuit.239  
In the Third Circuit, the standard itself has a low threshold—the 
“modified exigent circumstances test.”240  In practice, the exigency and 
reasonableness standards simply do not provide a level of protection 
appropriate to homes. 
C. Community Caretaking Warrants Are Not a Workable Solution 
Community caretaking warrants are a recently proposed solution to 
the problem of the expanding community caretaking exception.241  These 
warrants would be based on administrative warrants,242 which are used 
for health and safety inspections and are issued using a reasonableness 
standard.243  At first blush, this proposal seems to make sense.  Both the 
community caretaking exception and administrative warrants came 
about because the courts perceived a need for law enforcement to enter 
homes for reasons apart from crime investigation.244  However, deeper 
analysis reveals that warrants are not a workable solution to the 
problem of the community caretaking expansion: Warrants would be 
unnecessary in emergencies, their nature is incompatible with the 
concept of community caretaking, and they could lead to police 
performing traditional searches without showing probable cause. 
In jurisdictions that combine the emergency doctrine with 
community caretaking,245 or limit the exception to emergencies,246 
community caretaking warrants would serve no purpose because the 
emergency doctrine is itself an exception to the warrant requirement.247  
It is well established that law enforcement officers can enter homes to 
 
239. See supra Part II.C.1.b. 
240. Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2010).  Courts do not rely on the 
community caretaking doctrine per se, but “instead apply what appears to be a modified 
exigent circumstances test, with perhaps a lower threshold for exigency if the officer is acting 
in a community caretaking role.”  Id. 
241. See Marinos, supra note 28, at 284–89 (proposing a “community caretaking 
warrant” as a solution to “unreasonable police intrusions”). 
242. Id. 
243. See supra Part II.B.2. 
244. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the development of administrative warrants to 
allow agents to enter a home to perform health and safety inspections); supra Part II.B.3 
(explaining the development of the community caretaking exception that allowed police to 
enter a home to protect people and property). 
245. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
246. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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give emergency aid or to prevent imminent harm.248  In such cases, a 
warrant requirement defies common sense: If the officers can wait for a 
warrant, the situation is not an emergency.249  But, even in jurisdictions 
where community caretaking is kept distinct from the emergency 
doctrine, warrants are not a workable solution. 
Considering first the nature of warrants, this Comment finds it 
incompatible with the concept of community caretaking.  While 
administrative warrants are not used to investigate crimes per se, their 
purpose is to seek out violations of the law.250  For example, in Camara, 
inspectors were seeking entry to a home to search for violations of San 
Francisco’s housing code.251  Administrative warrants are undeniably 
investigatory in nature and thus contrary to the concept of community 
caretaking, which, as the name implies, is about taking care of people 
and property and not about investigating crime.252  The community 
caretaking expansion is a problem that needs fixing, but warrants are 
not the right tool for the job. 
Even if one were to look past this incompatibility and, arguendo, 
choose the wrong tool for the right job, there is a larger concern.  The 
lower standard required for the issuance of these warrants,253 coupled 
with the lack of analysis of officers’ subjective intent254 and a tolerance of 
pretext in the courts,255 could allow the police to use these proposed 
 
248. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
249. This concept further illustrates the point that community caretaking does not need 
to be expanded to homes to cover emergency situations and underscores the wisdom of the 
New Mexico Supreme Court, which distinguished between community caretaking and the 
emergency doctrine.  See supra notes 210–18 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra Part II.B.2. 
251. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525–26 (1967). 
252. While some courts may have blurred Cady’s totally divorced standard, it remains at 
the heart of the exception.  See supra notes 121, 127, 171 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. 
254. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to consider the relevancy of officers’ 
subjective motivations.  “Our cases have repeatedly rejected this approach.  An action is 
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of 
mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’”  Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).  “The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.”  Brigham City, 547 
U.S. at 404 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000)).  Particularly relevant 
to a discussion on community caretaking is this quote from the same case: “It therefore does 
not matter here—even if their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled—whether the 
officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to 
assist the injured and prevent further violence.”  Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405. 
255. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text. 
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warrants to investigate without probable cause.  Like criminal search 
warrants, administrative warrants are issued to allow agents into 
people’s homes, but a reasonableness standard takes the place of the 
higher standard of probable cause.256  Under a community caretaking 
warrant, if the need to enter the home to render aid outweighed the 
invasion caused by entering the home, then the search would be 
considered reasonable and the warrant would be granted.257  This 
standard for issuance sounds innocuous, but it could easily be subject to 
abuse, especially in jurisdictions that do not preserve the totally 
divorced standard from Cady.258  Under a community caretaking 
warrant, it is the officers’ community caretaking motive and not their 
investigative motive, if any, that would be evaluated by the 
reasonableness standard.259  However, the investigative motives are still 
there and in reality could be the driving force for the officers’ warrant 
request.260  To obtain a warrant, officers would simply have to articulate 
an “objectively reasonable” belief that community caretaking is 
necessary in order to enter a home261; for example, the oft-cited 
unanswered knock at the door.262 
 
256. Harper, supra note 99, at 21 (“Camara in effect replaced probable cause with a 
reasonableness standard for administrative inspections by a balance of societal interests and 
needs versus a slight invasion of individual privacy.”). 
257. See Marinos, supra note 28, at 285. 
258. See supra Parts II.C.1.c, II.2.C.a, II.2.C.e.  Also note that prior to the expansion of 
the exception from automobiles to homes, scholars warned of the potential for abuse.  See, 
e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When 
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 471 (1988) (“Of 
course, there is some danger that the police will attempt to use the ‘community caretaking 
function’ as a pretext for the stop of a suspect to take advantage of the more relaxed seizure 
standard for such encounters.”). 
259. If the investigative motive were to be evaluated, it would be under the standard of 
probable cause normally used for criminal search warrants.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
235–36 (1983) (discussing that during the criminal warrant process, a judge should issue a 
warrant based on probable cause, and he should make the decision whether there is probable 
cause based on common sense). 
260. For example, in Pinkard, police received a tip about people sleeping in an 
apartment near drugs and money, thought it “sounded like a drug house,” and sent a gang 
unit to investigate.  Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 18, at 7; see also supra notes 17–
20 and accompanying text.  Police later claimed to have been concerned that the people could 
have been suffering from an overdose, yet the actions of police (sending in a gang unit) 
indicate they were taking down a drug house.  See supra notes 17–20, 238 and accompanying 
text.  The search of the home was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as a valid exercise 
of community caretaking.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra text accompanying note 177. 
262. See supra notes 20, 115, 135 and accompanying text. 
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Absent an emergency and its accompanying indicators, an 
unanswered knock at the door could signify any number of things, 
including: the occupant needs assistance, the occupant is not home, the 
occupant cannot hear the knocking, the occupant is in the backyard, or 
the occupant does not wish to answer the door.263  Is it really objectively 
reasonable to believe the unanswered knock signifies only the first 
option?  It is difficult to posit the set of facts that would: (a) provide the 
objectively reasonable belief that someone needs help, and (b) allow 
time to wait for a warrant.  This objection is similar to the objection to 
community caretaking warrants in emergency situations.  The difference 
is that concerns that do not rise to the level of an emergency can wait. 
Still, some courts, unconcerned with officers’ subjective motivations, 
warn that police cannot wait.  For example, in State v. Gracia, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court notes that if the defendant had been 
“seriously injured,” he would have needed medical attention.264  And, in 
State v. Pinkard, it was the court that was concerned that officers could 
be prevented from assisting victims of a drug overdose.265  Yet, the 
officers on the scene in Gracia showed so little concern for Gracia’s 
condition that they were prepared to leave after they were initially 
unable to locate him.266  Similarly, the officers in Pinkard “never 
articulated any concern about the possibility of an overdose,”267 and they 
brought no medical personnel with them to the home.268  Courts have 
raised the specter of tragedies potentially allowed to happen because of 
police not entering a home, even though the facts of the cases that 
generated these warnings are the best arguments against them.269 
In some cases, the justifications provided by officers for community 
caretaking searches are obvious pretext.  For example, in Gracia and 
Pinkard, officers’ actions on the scene did not match up with their later-
articulated concerns about the medical conditions of the defendants in 
 
263. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 944 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
264. See State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 25, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (“If Gracia 
had been seriously injured in the accident, quick medical assistance would have been 
necessary.”). 
265. See State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶ 39–40, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
266. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 8. 
267. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 91 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  While the officers testified that 
they had some level of concern, “there is nothing in the record indicating that Officer Lopez 
articulated anything about how or why he was concerned.”  Id. ¶ 84. 
268. Id. at ¶ 87. 
269. See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 264–68. 
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those cases.270  Similarly, in Michigan v. Fisher, the police claimed to be 
concerned about blood trails, yet they did not contact medical 
personnel.271  Considering that courts tolerated the naked pretext in 
these cases, it is not an unfounded concern that such pretext could be 
the basis for warrants issued by courts under the lesser standard of 
reasonableness.  If such warrants were issued in jurisdictions where 
mixed motive caretaking were allowed, police could effectively obtain 
criminal search warrants using a standard normally required for health 
and safety inspections.272 
Warrants will not work to solve the problem of an expanded 
community caretaking exception.  Absent an emergency, in which case a 
warrant is not required, it is unnecessary for the police to enter a home 
immediately to render assistance.  If officers also suspect a crime, then 
they are free to get a warrant on that basis and should do so—using the 
proper standard of probable cause.273  If police are unable to meet that 
standard, it may be inconvenient for them, but that is why the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted in the first place.  With or without warrants, 
community caretaking searches of homes present a serious threat to 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
D. It Is Time to Roll Back the Expansion 
The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that too narrow a view of 
Fourth Amendment rights can lead to a slow and steady erosion of 
those rights.274  In other words, as Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice 
Bradley feared, yesterday’s close call has become today’s norm.275  
 
270. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
271. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 550 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding “the 
police decision to leave the scene and not return for several hours—without resolving any 
potentially dangerous situation and without calling for medical assistance—inconsistent with 
a reasonable belief that Fisher was in need of immediate aid”). 
272. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967). 
273. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
274. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).  In 1886, the Court 
warned: 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but 
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, 
by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.  This can 
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be liberally construed. 
Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
275. See State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 66, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Bradley, 
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Community caretaking, once a limited exception, has, through the 
malleable standard of reasonableness, greatly expanded.276  The seeds of 
this expansion are seen in the Cady decision, which spawned the 
community caretaking exception.277  Immediately after explaining that 
community caretaking is “totally divorced” from the “acquisition of 
evidence,” the Court pointed out that a warrantless search of a vehicle 
could be reasonable to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence 
even if the possibility of such removal or destruction was “remote, if not 
nonexistent.”278  Community caretaking itself is arguably an expansion 
and weakening of the exigent circumstances test.279 
This Comment shares Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Prosser’s 
recent concern that the “exception is now being stretched and extended 
even more.”280  Not only has the community caretaking exception 
expanded to homes, but its protective limits have been stretched and 
weakened over time.281  When the Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded 
community caretaking, it also weakened the totally divorced standard 
set in Cady.282  Its view is that the U.S. Supreme Court was simply 
“noting that many police-citizen encounters have nothing to do with 
crime, not [as] requiring that they must have nothing to do with 
crime.”283  The exception is stretched further because pretext is now 
tolerated and even sometimes provided by the courts.284  This new 
tolerance—one might say encouragement—of naked pretext is the most 
dangerous aspect of allowing the community caretaking exception to 
cover warrantless home searches.  If mere silence can reasonably 
indicate a person in need of medical attention, whether one knows 
someone is present or not, then a simple unanswered knock on the door 
 
J., dissenting) (“I fear that today’s close call will become tomorrow’s norm.”), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
276. See supra Part II.C. 
277. See generally supra Part I. 
278. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1973). 
279. See supra note 240. 
280. State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶ 70, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87  (Prosser, J., 
dissenting) (“What appeared to some members of the Pinkard court as a significant departure 
from the core principles of the exception is now being stretched and extended even more.”). 
281. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
283. State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 35, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (alteration in 
original) (quoting People v. Cordero, 830 N.E.2d 830, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (O’Malley, J., 
concurring)). 
284. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text. 
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by police becomes an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement.285  Suspicion of drug activity, combined with an after-the-
fact concern about an overdose, becomes all that is needed for police to 
make a warrantless home entry.286  Furthermore, if drugs are uncovered 
during those warrantless entries, it is unlikely a court will find the 
searches unreasonable.287 
The U.S. Supreme Court must act to roll back this expanded and 
weakened exception.  There is reason to believe that it may do so in the 
near future.  In 2006, the Court granted certiorari in Brigham City to 
resolve a circuit split on another Fourth Amendment exception—the 
emergency doctrine288—and, in 2012, it clarified the Brigham City 
decision in Ryburn.289  In 2013, the Court settled two more Fourth 
Amendment questions in Missouri v. McNeely290 and Florida v. 
Jardinnes.291  Resolving Fourth Amendment conflicts remains an area of 
active interest for the Court, and community caretaking needs to be 
addressed.292  As more jurisdictions contribute to “the hair-splitting 
distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,”293 it is more likely that the Court will have to sort out the 
 
285. See Fink, supra note 231, at 153. 
286. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 92, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]n unarticulated concern about the possibility of an overdose can always be 
later invoked by a court when officers arrive at what they think is a ‘drug house.’”), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
287. See Dimino, supra note 208, at 1499–500 (“A malleable standard in Fourth 
Amendment cases presents a particular danger that it will be practically difficult to declare 
unreasonable a search that has resulted in the seizure of evidence proving a defendant’s 
guilt.”).  But see Scalia, supra note 62, at 1181–82 (speculating that what constitutes a 
reasonable search is left to judges because “we do not trust juries to answer the . . . question 
dispassionately when an obviously guilty defendant is in the dock”). 
288. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) (“We granted certiorari in light of 
differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth 
Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency 
situation.” (citations omitted)). 
289. See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990 (2012) (per curiam). 
290. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013) (holding that the dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood is not a per se exigency). 
291. See supra note 57. 
292. See David L. Hudson, Courts In a Muddle Over 4th Amendment’s Community 
Caretaking Exception, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:09 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/courts_in_a_muddle_over_4th_amendments_community_caretaking_excepti
on/; Nicholas J. Wagoner, New Exception Allowing Warrantless Home Entries Headed to the 
High Court?, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Jan. 6, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/01/a-
new-exception-to-warrantless-searches-of-the-home.html. 
293. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
34306-m
qt_97-1 Sheet No. 85 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 85 Side B      01/13/2014   11:22:05
C M
Y K
HELDING 10 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2013  1:58 PM 
162 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:1 
mess.294 
The decisions in Jones and Jardines provide a roadmap, which the 
Court should use to resolve the conflict over the community caretaking 
exception when it finally reaches the high court.295  The reach of the 
reasonableness standard has exceeded its grasp.  While reasonableness 
initially added to people’s Fourth Amendment protections, it is now at 
the point where it is taking those protections away.296  The Court began 
to correct this problem in Jones, continued to do so in Jardines, and 
should do so again with a case on the community caretaking exception.297  
The Court must confine the community caretaking exception to 
automobiles and people outside of their homes.  The expansion into 
homes should be halted and reversed. 
Jones “provide[d] the foundation for a paradigm shift in the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.”298  Until Jones, searches were 
evaluated solely in light of the reasonable expectation test.299  After 
Jones, physical intrusion has been reinvigorated as a protector of the 
Fourth Amendment.300  Jardines built on the foundation laid in Jones by 
applying the physical intrusion test to the home.301  The expansion of the 
community caretaking exception to the home is entirely about physical 
intrusion.  The physical intrusion of placing a device on the underside of 
an automobile, rejected in Jones, 302 and the sniffing nose of a dog on a 
porch, rejected in Jardines,303 are arguably much less intrusive than a 
 
294. See MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, No. 12-12061-RGS, 2013 WL 2303760 at *5 
(D. Mass. May 24, 2013) (explaining that when “[f]aced with [both the] absence of controlling 
authority and conflicting precedent” about whether community caretaking applied to home 
entries, officers who entered a home “would not have known whether [their] actions violated 
[the occupant’s] Fourth Amendment rights” and were thus entitled to qualified immunity 
against a § 1983 action); Hudson, supra note 292 (highlighting the confusion among the courts 
and noting that “the Supreme Court may need to wade into the troubled waters of 
community caretaking to explain the concept it identified 40 years ago”). 
295. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
296. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
298. Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth 
Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 62 (Mar. 2011), http://www.michigan
lawreview.org/assets/fi/110/Goldberg.pdf. 
299. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
301. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013). 
302. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948, 954 (2012). 
303. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18. 
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police officer actually entering a home.  If the mere placement of a 
device on the exterior of a car, or a dog sniffing from a porch are 
physical trespasses, a fortiori police officers’ physical entry into the 
interior of a home must be a trespass.  The Court has applied the 
physical intrusion test to a car and to the curtilage of the home, surely it 
is ready to apply it to the threshold of the home.304 
Jones and Jardines are clearly based on an originalist interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment.305  Fortunately, homes are places that both 
originalist “physical intrusion” justices and “expectation of privacy” 
justices agree deserve substantial protection: 
In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an 
individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and 
specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.”306 
Denying the expansion based on “physical intrusion” would allow the 
originalist members of the Court to continue to expand that rationale, 
while the others could deny the expansion based on the privacy 
expectations people hold in their homes. 
One potential obstacle to such a ruling is the Jones decision’s 
requirement that “[t]respass alone does not qualify” as a search; the 
trespass must be combined with “an attempt to find something or to 
obtain information.”307  However, once the police enter a home with an 
investigatory purpose, what it is the police are investigating is 
irrelevant.308  Moreover, despite this recent resurgence of the trespassory 
test, Jones does not replace Katz and the existing elements of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.309  “[A]n unconsented police entry . . . into a 
 
304. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52. 
305. In Jardines, Justice Scalia discusses the historical definition of curtilage from 1769.  
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 225 (1769)); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 34 (2001))). 
306. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
307. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5. 
308. Id. at 954 (“There is no precedent for the proposition that whether a search has 
occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.”). 
309. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test.  Situations involving 
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residential unit” is still a search.310  Additionally, common instances of 
community caretaking—looking for potentially injured persons, 
checking into what appears to be a burglary, or investigating strange 
smells or noises—arguably have some investigatory purpose311 and could 
reasonably meet that requirement of the Jones search test. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Fourth Amendment rights have proven as malleable as the 
reasonableness standard once invoked by the courts to protect them.  
Steady hammering over the years has weakened them both.312  To re-
strengthen Fourth Amendment rights, the U.S. Supreme Court must 
reshape the community caretaking exception using the stronger physical 
intrusion standard.  If it does not, people’s homes, in which they once 
had their strongest Fourth Amendment protections, will offer no greater 
refuge than their automobiles.  This result cannot be what the Framers 
had in mind when guaranteeing to all Americans the “right . . . to be 
secure in their [homes].”313 
In 1759, thirty years before the Fourth Amendment was proposed, 
Richard Jackson said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to 
purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor 
Safety.”314  Whether we deserve it or not, the trend is that once we give 
 
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz 
analysis.”). 
310. See LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 2.3(b). 
311. See supra notes 103–04, 114, 129, 156, 165–66 and accompanying text. 
312. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
313. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).  The Fourth Amendment was adopted 
partially in response to “general warrants,” which were common at the time and “exposed 
any person or property to seizure ‘in the most arbitrary manner.’”  WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, 684 (2009) 
(quoting Statement of Governor Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 
24, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 588 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington D.C., 2d ed. 1836) 
[hereinafter DEBATES]); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting DEBATES, supra note 313, at 588) (“Patrick Henry warned that the new 
Federal Constitution [without the Fourth Amendment] would expose the citizenry to 
searches and seizures ‘in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason.’”). 
314. RICHARD JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
GOVERNMENT OF PENSYLVANIA 289 (London, Printed for R. Griffiths 1759) (emphasis 
omitted).  Many people incorrectly attribute this sentiment to Benjamin Franklin, but he was 
not its author.  3 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 124–26 & n.1 
(John Bigelow ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1887). 
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up liberty for safety, we receive neither.315  By expanding the community 
caretaking exception, in the name of safety, courts have given up our 
liberties.  Under the cover of reasonableness, the courts have hammered 
our malleable Fourth Amendment liberties into a new shape—one that 
would be unfamiliar to those who drafted and adopted that amendment.  
The Court must take control before the hammering shatters those 
liberties, leaving the people of this country with mere fragments of a 
once robust constitutional guarantee. 
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315. See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi & Michael Crowley, Homeland Insecurity: After 
Boston, The Struggle Between Liberty and Security, TIME MAGAZINE, May 13, 2013, at 22, 
24–28.  Despite an October 2011 grant of new surveillance powers to FBI agents to fight 
domestic terrorism, domestic terrorists were still able to strike the Boston Marathon in 2013.  
Id. at 24. 
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